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TOPIC:

WHO GETS THE CREDIT? A STUDY OF HOW PRODUCERS AND  
PRESENTERS ARE VALUED IN GHANA'S MEDIA INDUSTRY.

BY

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## DECLARATION

### STUDENT DECLARATION

I, Paula Ashitsoo Mensah-Doku, declare that this thesis, except quotations and references contained in published works, which have all been identified and duly acknowledged, is entirely my original work, and it has not been submitted, either in part or whole, for another degree elsewhere. Therefore, I bear the responsibility for any shortcomings.



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### SUPERVISOR'S DECLARATION

We, the undersigned supervisors, declare that we supervised the preparation and presentation of this work in accordance with the guidelines for the supervision of PhD theses as laid down by the University of Media, Arts and Communication (UniMAC).



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## DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to **my family**, whose unwavering love, support, and encouragement have sustained me through every challenge. To my husband, **Bernard Edoe Esianyoh**, for his constant belief in me and for standing by me with patience and understanding, this achievement is as much yours as it is mine.

I also dedicate this work to **my friends and mentors** who inspired, guided, and encouraged me along the way, reminding me that perseverance and dedication always bear fruit.

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## ABSTRACT

This study examines how media producers and presenters are valued and credited within Ghanaian media organisations across economic, symbolic, and organisational dimensions, with particular attention to how visibility shapes perceived professional value. The study is guided by three research questions on (i) comparative valuation (remuneration, recognition, organisational authority), (ii) crediting practices and role differences, and (iii) how visibility relates to professional value, alongside three hypotheses anticipating higher symbolic recognition for presenters (H1), influence-without-credit for producers (H2), and a positive association between professional value and visibility (H3). Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative-dominant mixed-methods design within a single-case study of Media General Ghana Limited. It follows an interpretivist approach and uses a sequential strategy in which questionnaire data establish descriptive patterns and open-ended questions deepen the interpretation of valuation and crediting experiences. A total of 20 completed questionnaires were analysed, comprising an even split between presenters and producers (n = 10 each).

Findings indicate that valuation is multi-dimensional and role-differentiated. Economic valuation was moderate overall, with presenters tending to score higher than producers on the Economic Value Index, while symbolic recognition was generally high for both groups, with only modest role separation. Organisational valuation/power tended to favour producers, reflecting their coordination and decision-making roles within production workflows. The most pronounced divide emerged in crediting: presenters were credited more frequently across publicity channels and scored higher on the Crediting Index, whereas producers reported comparatively lower routine attribution. Visibility was consequential for perceived worth; within the dataset, visibility was moderately and significantly associated with feeling professionally valued ( $\rho = .536$ ,  $p = .015$ ), supporting the central mechanism proposed in H3. Institutional mechanisms help explain these patterns. Programme influence was most often attributed to station management, and promotion was perceived to depend chiefly on management discretion and networks alongside performance metrics, indicating that advancement is shaped by both discretionary gatekeeping and measurable performance signals. The study concludes that strengthening transparent crediting standards and clarifying promotion criteria are key organisational reforms to reduce recognition gaps between frontstage and backstage roles.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

| <b>Symbol</b>              | <b>Definition</b>   | <b>Page first used</b> |
|----------------------------|---|------------------------|
| <b>FM</b>                  | Frequency Modulation (FM radio broadcasting)                                | 14                     |
| <b>UNESCO</b>              | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation            | 14                     |
| <b>DCS</b>                 | Department of Communication Studies   | 15                     |
| <b>UG</b>                  | University of Ghana   | 15                     |
| <b>MFWA</b>                | Media Foundation for West Africa  | 15                     |
| <b>US</b>                  | United States   | 28                     |
| <b>HR</b>                  | Human Resources   | 34                     |
| <b>TV</b>                  | Television  | 37                     |
| <b>%</b>                   | Per cent/percentage   | 41                     |
| <b>n</b>                   | Subsample size/count in a subgroup (  | 41                     |
| <b>N</b>                   | Total sample size (overall valid responses)                                 | 41                     |
| <b>M</b>                   | Mean  | 42                     |
| <b>Mdn</b>                 | Median  | 42                     |
| <b>SD</b>                  | Standard deviation  | 42                     |
| <b>p</b>                   | p-value (statistical significance probability)                              | 43                     |
| <b><math>\rho</math></b>   | Spearman's rho (rank correlation coefficient)                               | 43                     |
| <b><math>\alpha</math></b> | Alpha level (significance threshold)  | 43                     |
| <b>IQR</b>                 | Interquartile range   | 43                     |
| <b>MW</b>                  | Mann–Whitney (U) test (nonparametric test for group differences)            | 43                     |
| <b>r</b>                   | Effect size reported as r   | 43                     |
| <b>CEO</b>                 | Chief Executive Officer   | 65                     |
| <b>GM</b>                  | General Manager   | 65                     |
| <b>SSNIT</b>               | Social Security and National Insurance Trust                                | 69                     |
| <b>IBM</b>                 | International Business Machines (the company behind IBM SPSS Statistics)    | 74                     |
| <b>SPSS</b>                | Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (software: IBM SPSS Statistics) | 74                     |
| <b>GHS</b>                 | Ghana Cedis   | 80                     |

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the study, outlining the background and motivation for examining how producers and presenters are valued and credited within Ghana's media industry. It presents the problem statement, study aim and objectives, research questions and hypotheses, significance, scope and limitations, key definitions, and the organisation of the dissertation.

### 1.1 Background of the Study

Across the cultural and creative industries, the production of media content depends on diverse forms of labour that are organised within hierarchical workplaces and project-based routines. Global policy and research reports that culture and creativity account for a meaningful share of employment and value creation, yet creators' livelihoods and working conditions remain vulnerable to shocks and unequal reward structures (UNESCO, 2022). Scholarly work in creative labour and cultural work similarly shows that recognition, reputation, and network position can shape career opportunities and job quality, often in ways that do not align neatly with the scale of labour performed (Banks et al., 2013; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).

Production studies further emphasise that media work is not only a technical process but also a cultural one, shaped by organisational power, professional ideologies, and visibility regimes. Caldwell (2008) demonstrates that production cultures involve shared beliefs and ritualised practices through which workers make sense of their labour and contest status within the industry. Within these cultures, public-facing roles may attract disproportionate symbolic recognition, while 'below-the-line' and backstage roles remain less visible despite their influence on creative and editorial outcomes (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer et al., 2009). This visibility–value dynamic is especially relevant in broadcasting, where presenters routinely embody a programme's identity and become central to audience-facing branding, even when producers shape content architecture, editorial direction, and workflow coordination.

In Ghana, media liberalisation since the early 1990s has expanded the broadcast landscape and intensified competition for audiences, advertising, and talent. National Communications Authority data indicate that, by the third quarter of 2022, 707 FM radio stations were authorised and 513 were operational; in the same period, 155 television stations were authorised and 113 were operational (National Communications Authority, 2023). This scale of outlets has encouraged strong commercial pressures and heightened the premium placed on on-air

visibility, particularly in television and flagship radio programming. At the same time, sector assessments note persistent challenges with the financial viability of media organisations, job insecurity, and uneven employment conditions for media workers (Department of Communication Studies, University of Ghana, & Media Foundation for West Africa [DCS-UG & MFWA], 2023).

Recent Ghana-focused evidence on working conditions underscores that many media practitioners experience precarious arrangements, limited protections, and perceptions of unfair reward structures in some organisations (Yeboah-Banin, 2023). However, existing discussions of labour conditions often treat ‘media workers’ as a broad category rather than examining how value is differentially constructed across specific roles within production teams. This study, therefore, focuses on a role pair that is routinely visible in everyday media consumption but often analytically separated in scholarship: producers (who coordinate, shape, and manage programme development and execution) and presenters (who deliver content on air and publicly represent programmes and brands). By examining economic, symbolic, and organisational dimensions of valuation between these roles, the study situates Ghana’s media labour dynamics within wider debates about creative labour, production culture, and the organisational politics of recognition.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Despite the centrality of collaborative labour to media production, recognition and reward within broadcast organisations are often unevenly distributed. In many media workplaces, public-facing roles accrue reputational advantages because audiences, advertisers, and organisational leaders can more readily attribute programme identity and success to those who appear on air (Banks et al., 2013; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011). Yet producers frequently exercise substantial editorial influence through agenda setting, story selection, programme pacing, and coordination of teams and resources while remaining less publicly credited for these contributions (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer et al., 2009).

In Ghana’s expanded and competitive media ecosystem, these dynamics may have particular consequences for professional status, remuneration patterns, and career progression. Sector reporting indicates that working conditions can be insecure and uneven, with concerns about pay, contracts, and organisational support raised in assessments of the industry (Department of Communication Studies, University of Ghana, & Media Foundation for West Africa [DCS-UG

& MFWA], 2023; Yeboah-Banin & Braimah, 2023). However, there is limited role-specific empirical evidence on how producers and presenters are comparatively valued and credited within Ghanaian media organisations, and on the organisational mechanisms through which visibility translates (or does not translate) into tangible reward.

This gap matters for at least three reasons. First, differential valuation can affect workplace morale and collaboration, especially in a production process that depends on coordinated interdependence. Second, sustained undervaluation of backstage roles may contribute to retention problems and undermine the quality and continuity of production expertise. Third, understanding how recognition and reward are allocated across roles can inform managerial practice and policy discussions about fair labour standards, professional development, and sustainable media production. Accordingly, the study investigates how producers and presenters are valued in economic terms (e.g., pay and benefits), symbolic terms (e.g., credit and recognition), and organisational terms (e.g., authority and decision-making)

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

This study aims to examine how producers and presenters are valued and credited within Ghanaian media organisations across economic, symbolic, and organisational dimensions.

The specific objectives are:

1. To examine how producers and presenters are valued within Ghanaian media organisations in economic, symbolic, and organisational terms.
2. To analyse formal and informal crediting practices within media organisations and how these practices relate to visibility and perceived creative contribution.
3. To explore how producers and presenters perceive and narrate their own professional value, recognition, and career trajectories.
4. To identify institutional factors that shape differences in valuation between producers and presenters.

## **1.4 Research Questions / Hypothesis**

### **1.4.1 Research Questions**

1. How are producers and presenters valued within Ghana's media industry in terms of remuneration, recognition, and organisational authority?
2. What crediting practices exist within media organisations, and how do these practices differ between producers and presenters?
3. How do producers and presenters perceive the relationship between visibility and professional value?

### **1.4.2 Hypotheses**

H1: Presenters are more likely than producers to receive higher levels of symbolic recognition due to their audience-facing visibility.

H2: Producers exercise substantial editorial and organisational influence but receive comparatively lower public recognition and formal credit.

H3: Perceived professional value within media organisations is positively associated with visibility rather than with the extent of production labour.

## **1.5 Significance of the Study**

Academically, the study extends production studies and creative labour scholarship by applying their concerns with visibility, credit, and organisational hierarchy to the Ghanaian media context (Banks et al., 2013; Caldwell, 2008; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011; Mayer et al., 2009). It contributes empirical evidence on how value is constructed and contested across distinct roles within broadcast production teams. It offers a role-specific account that complements wider discussions of working conditions in Ghana's media sector (Yeboah-Bani & Braimah, 2023).

Practically, the findings may help media managers and production leaders design clearer crediting conventions, more transparent reward structures, and fairer pathways for professional progression. For professional associations and labour advocates, evidence on role-based valuation can support discussions about decent work standards and organisational accountability within media institutions (International Labour Organisation, 2023). At a broader policy level, the study can inform conversations on sustainability and professionalism

in Ghana's growing media landscape (Department of Communication Studies, University of Ghana, & Media Foundation for West Africa [DCS-UG & MFWA], 2023).

## 1.6 Scope and Limitations

The study focuses on producers and presenters working within selected Ghanaian media organisations, with attention to television, radio, and digital news production, where these roles are clearly differentiated. It examines valuation through economic indicators (e.g., pay bands and benefits), symbolic indicators (e.g., credit and recognition), and organisational indicators (e.g., authority and participation in decision-making), using a mixed-methods design that combines questionnaires and open-ended questions.

Key limitations relate to access and measurement. First, remuneration data may be reported in ranges rather than exact figures for reasons of privacy and organisational policy, which can constrain fine-grained comparisons. Second, the study relies on self-reported perceptions and experiences, which may be influenced by individual career stage, organisational culture, and recall. Third, because the study uses purposive sampling in selected organisations, the findings are intended to be analytically generalisable to similar contexts rather than statistically representative of all media workers in Ghana.

## 1.7 Definition of Key Terms

**Producer:** A media professional who coordinates and shapes programme production by planning content, organising workflows, guiding editorial direction, and overseeing technical and human resources through the production process.

**Presenter:** A media professional who delivers programme content on air (or on-screen), mediates interactions with audiences and guests, and publicly represents the programme and, often, the media brand.

**Economic value:** The extent to which a role is rewarded materially through pay, benefits, and perceived job security within the organisation.

**Symbolic value:** The extent to which a role is recognised and credited through visibility, reputation, and acknowledgement of creative contribution (Banks et al., 2013).

**Organisational value:** The extent to which a role is positioned as influential within organisational decision-making structures and everyday production authority (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer et al., 2009).

**Crediting practices:** Formal and informal ways through which creative and production contributions are acknowledged, including programme credits, internal recognition, and public attributions of authorship.

## **1.8 Organisation of the Thesis**

The dissertation is organised into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the study and presents the background, problem statement, aim and objectives, research questions and hypotheses, significance, scope and limitations, key definitions, and chapter organisation. Chapter Two reviews relevant literature and develops the study's conceptual framing. Chapter Three describes the methodology, including research design, sampling, data collection instruments, and data analysis procedures. Chapter Four presents the findings from the questionnaire. Chapter Five discusses the findings in relation to the literature, draws conclusions, outlines implications for practice and policy, and provides recommendations for future research.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews relevant literature to establish how producers and presenters are valued within Ghanaian media organisations across economic, symbolic and organisational dimensions. It synthesises international scholarship on media labour, visibility and credit allocation, and positions these debates within African and Ghanaian media industry conditions. The review also clarifies the study's core concepts and develops the conceptual model that informs the research questions and hypotheses.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 2.3 develops the conceptual review and the study's conceptual model. Section 2.4 synthesises empirical evidence with explicit global–Africa–Ghana positioning. Section 2.5 summarises the literature gaps and links them to the study's objectives, research questions and hypotheses.

#### 2.1 Theoretical Framework

##### 2.1.1 Why is theory necessary for this study

This study examines how producers and presenters are valued within Ghanaian media organisations across economic (e.g., remuneration), symbolic (e.g., recognition/visibility), and organisational (e.g., authority) dimensions. Explaining why these roles may be valued differently requires theories that account for (i) how recognition becomes a resource, (ii) how media work is organised and rewarded, (iii) how commercial logics shape organisational decisions, and (iv) how visibility and branding produce status. Accordingly, the study draws on Bourdieu's field and capital theory, media/creative labour theory, production studies, political economy of communication, and gender/feminist perspectives, with celebrity/branding treated as a visibility mechanism that can convert into other forms of advantage. (Bourdieu, 1986; Caldwell, 2008; Deuze, 2007; Driessens, 2013; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011; Mayer, 2011; Mosco, 2009).

##### 2.1.2 Bourdieu: field, capital, and symbolic power (valuation as a struggle over recognised worth)

Bourdieu's framework treats social life as organised into fields (structured arenas such as journalism or broadcasting) in which actors compete for resources and legitimacy. Within a

field, different forms of capital economic, cultural, social, and symbolic are accumulated and converted, and symbolic capital functions as recognised prestige that can legitimise authority and open access to opportunities. This is useful for the producer–presenter comparison because it helps distinguish (a) economic rewards (pay/benefits), (b) organisational power (positions that control decisions), and (c) symbolic recognition (status attached to being known, credited, and publicly associated with media output). (Bourdieu, 1986).

### **2.1.3 Celebrity/visibility as “capital”: visibility as a convertible resource**

To sharpen the visibility mechanism, the study treats celebrity/visibility as a field-specific resource that can be converted into other benefits. Driessens conceptualises celebrity capital as a form of capital that can translate into economic or political resources, extending field theory to explain how being widely known produces advantages beyond direct job performance. This is directly relevant to broadcast contexts where presenters are organisationally positioned as programme “faces” and public representatives. (Driessens, 2013). Classic celebrity scholarship further supports the idea that celebrity status is structured and socially produced rather than purely individual. (Rojek, 2001).

### **2.1.4 Media and creative labour theory: how media work is organised, normalised, and unevenly rewarded**

Media labour scholarship examines how media work is shaped by project pressures, insecurity, identity claims, and the normalisation of long hours and “passion” as compensation. Deuze frames media work as a distinctive occupational world in which workers navigate unstable conditions and blurred boundaries between life and work, while Hesmondhalgh and Baker analyse how “good” and “bad” work experiences are unevenly distributed across cultural industries and tied to recognition, autonomy, and security. (Deuze, 2007; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).

### **2.1.5 Production studies: credit, hierarchy, and the invisibility of “below-the-line” labour**

Production studies focus on how media texts are made within institutions, highlighting hierarchy, attribution, and routine practices that shape whose labour is seen as authorship. Mayer’s work on “below-the-line” labour shows how television production relies on extensive work that is structurally devalued or obscured, while Caldwell examines production cultures and the rituals through which industries justify and manage labour and status. (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).

### **2.1.6 Political economy of communication: commodification, branding, and organisational incentive structures**

Political economy explains media organisations as institutions shaped by commodification, market logics, ownership, and the need to secure revenue and audiences. Mosco's framework foregrounds processes such as commodification and structuration, which are useful for analysing how organisations decide what (and who) is commercially valuable especially in settings where audience metrics, sponsorship, and branding shape programming choices. (Mosco, 2009). Brand-culture scholarship additionally explains why organisations invest in visible "faces" and self-branding as part of value creation. (Banet-Weiser, 2012).

### **2.1.7 Gender and feminist perspectives: valuation as patterned by unequal access to visibility and authority**

Gendered labour scholarship cautions against treating recognition systems as neutral: access to projects, visibility, credibility, and advancement can be structured by gender norms and informal workplace cultures. Gill's analysis of "cool, creative" industries shows how equality narratives can coexist with persistent inequality, especially under flexible/project-based conditions. McRobbie similarly critiques celebratory "creative economy" discourses that normalise precarious work and uneven reward. (Gill, 2002; McRobbie, 2016).

### **2.1.8 Theoretical synthesis and implications for the study's research questions and hypotheses**

Taken together, these theories position valuation as a structured outcome of visibility regimes and organisational power, not merely individual merit. Bourdieu and celebrity-capital scholarship explain how visibility can translate into symbolic recognition and other advantages (relevant to H1 and H3) (Bourdieu, 1986; Driessens, 2013). Media labour and political economy explain why organisational reward systems can privilege what is most marketable and publicly legible often the visible "face" of a programme while production labour remains less recognised despite being essential (supporting H3) (Deuze, 2007; Mosco, 2009). (Polity Books)

Production studies provide the most direct explanation for crediting practices as institutionalised processes that distribute authorship, status, and recognition unevenly across roles (supporting RQ2 and H2) (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011). Finally, gender/feminist perspectives ensure that differences in recognition and authority are interpreted with attention

to patterned inequalities in access to visibility, credibility, and advancement (Gill, 2002; McRobbie, 2016).

In practical terms, the framework guides the study as follows:

1. RQ1 is examined by separating economic, symbolic, and organisational value (field/capital + political economy + media labour).
2. RQ2 is examined by treating crediting as an institutional practice tied to hierarchy and authorship narratives (production studies).
3. RQ3 is examined by conceptualising visibility as convertible symbolic/celebrity capital (Bourdieu + Driessens + celebrity/brand culture).
4. H1–H3 function as theoretically grounded expectations about how visibility, crediting practices, and organisational power interact to shape perceived professional value.

## **2.2 Conceptual Framework**

### **2.2.1 Producer and presenter as distinct (but interdependent) roles**

This study treats producers and presenters as distinct occupational roles that contribute differently to media output and are positioned differently within organisational hierarchies. Producers are conceptualised as the actors who coordinate and shape production processes (planning, editorial coordination, workflow oversight), while presenters are conceptualised as the actors who deliver content publicly and mediate the organisation’s relationship with audiences through on-air performance and representation. Although both roles contribute to programme success, their work is not equally visible, and their contributions are not always equally named, narrated, or rewarded.

To avoid treating these roles as “common-sense” categories, the study also recognises that production work is typically collective and multi-staged (from development through distribution), with role boundaries shaped by organisational routines and industry conventions. A broad audio-visual industry guide (World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], 2022) underscores that production involves multiple stages and role-based contributions that can be differentially recognised depending on how projects are organised and governed. (World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], 2022).

### **2.2.2 What “valuation” means in this study: economic, symbolic, and organisational value**

The central concept in this study is valuation how organisations and audiences assign worth to roles. Valuation is conceptualised across three linked dimensions:

1. Economic value: material rewards and security (e.g., pay, benefits, job stability).
2. Symbolic value: legitimacy, prestige, and recognition being seen as important, talented, or central to the organisation’s output.
3. Organisational value: formal or informal authority and influence over decisions, resources, and editorial direction.

This three-part framing is necessary because professional standing in media organisations rarely follows pay alone, and recognition does not always track actual labour contribution. Bourdieu’s theory is particularly useful here because it treats symbolic value as a form of capital that depends on recognition that is, being perceived and accepted as legitimate or prestigious by relevant audiences within a field.

### **2.2.3 Recognition vs crediting: separating the outcome from the practice**

A recurring weakness in producer–presenter debates is that “recognition” and “credit” are often treated as synonyms. This study distinguishes them analytically:

1. Recognition is the outcome: the social judgement that a person or role is worthy, reputable, and valuable (symbolic value). In Bourdieusian terms, symbolic capital exists only insofar as it is recognised.
2. Crediting is the practice: the organisational and cultural procedures through which contribution is attributed (or withheld) for example, formal programme credits, on-air mentions, promo materials, platform captions, internal awards, managerial praise, and informal narratives about “who made the show”.

This distinction matters because individuals can contribute heavily and hold substantial responsibility without receiving visible attribution. Production studies show that media work often depends on extensive “below-the-line” labour that is structurally obscured or devalued an invisibility that is reproduced through routine organisational practices, including how contribution is publicly narrated. More broadly, scholarship on credit in creative industries

demonstrates that credit functions as a career resource: it supports reputation, future opportunities, and sometimes pay precisely because credit is a form of recognised attribution.

Implication for the study: Objective 2 and RQ2 are treated as questions about systems of attribution (crediting practices), while Objectives 1 and 3 address how those systems translate into perceived worth (recognition and professional value).

#### **2.2.4 Visibility as the linking mechanism (how “being seen” becomes value)**

The study conceptualises visibility as repeated public exposure and legibility—being consistently present in the audience-facing space where media identity is produced and evaluated. Visibility is not merely “fame”; it is an organisationally and technologically mediated condition that can be accumulated and leveraged.

Two complementary ideas ground this mechanism:

1. Symbolic capital (Bourdieu): visibility can facilitate recognition, which then functions as symbolic capital inside a field.
2. Celebrity capital (Driessens): celebrity can be conceptualised as accumulated media visibility that is convertible—it can be translated into other advantages (e.g., economic opportunities, influence), depending on context.

This is particularly relevant to presenter roles, which are structurally positioned to accumulate visibility through on-air presence, promotional materials, and platform circulation. The relevance of visibility as convertible value is not only theoretical: a Ghana-based thesis on personal branding reports that Ghanaian celebrities and their management teams often treat identity and visibility as commodities that can yield social and economic returns, reinforcing the plausibility of visibility-to-value pathways in the Ghanaian context.

#### **2.2.5 Organisational and institutional conditions shaping valuation (why the same visibility can pay off differently)**

Visibility does not automatically translate into reward; conversion depends on organisational and institutional conditions. The study conceptualises these conditions as moderators that shape how visibility and labour become valued:

1. Commercial and branding logics: organisations may prioritise publicly marketable labour because it is easier to commodify and attach to programmes and advertisers. Political economy scholarship highlights commodification as a central dynamic in media systems.

2. Brand culture and self-branding: In “brand cultures”, identity and authenticity can become strategic resources, shaping how workers are positioned and rewarded.
3. Organisational hierarchy and production culture: internal status systems determine whose labour is treated as authorship and whose is treated as support.
4. Gendered norms of credibility and visibility: inequalities in access to “good work”, recognition, and progression can persist even where industries present themselves as open and meritocratic.

These moderators directly support Objective 4 by identifying plausible organisational mechanisms that shape producer–presenter valuation differences.

### **2.2.6 Conceptual model for the study (connected pathway from visibility to value)**

Bringing these concepts together, the study proposes a role-sensitive model in which valuation emerges from the interaction of role position, crediting practices, and visibility, under specific organisational conditions.

#### **Core model (narrative):**

1. Role position shapes typical exposure and attribution opportunities: presenters are structurally placed in high-visibility spaces, while producers are structurally placed in low-visibility spaces but may hold substantial organisational influence through editorial and coordination responsibilities.
2. Crediting practices determine whether the contribution becomes publicly legible (through formal credits, on-air mentions, promos, and internal recognition). Where crediting systematically foregrounds on-air roles, recognition will disproportionately accumulate around presenters.
3. Visibility accumulates as a resource (celebrity capital/recognisability) that can increase symbolic value (recognition, prestige) and may convert into economic (earning power, endorsements) and organisational value (influence, negotiation leverage), depending on organisational strategy and market incentives.

#### **Model:**

1. Presenter role → higher visibility → higher symbolic recognition → (potential conversion to economic and organisational advantages)

2. Producer role → higher production labour / organisational influence → organisational value (authority) but lower public recognition when crediting practices and visibility regimes under-attribute backstage labour

**How this operationalises the set hypotheses:**

1. H1 becomes the expectation that the presenter's visibility will be associated with higher symbolic recognition.
2. H2 becomes the expectation that producers may exercise organisational influence while receiving lower public recognition and formal credit.
3. H3 becomes the expectation that perceived professional value will correlate more strongly with visibility (and its crediting supports) than with the extent of production labour.

## **2.3 Review of Related Empirical Studies**

### **2.3.1 Global evidence: labour hierarchies, visibility, and who gets valued**

A consistent finding in media labour research is that valuation is structured through a hierarchy of roles that separates public-facing, attributed labour from backstage, collective labour. Production studies show how “below-the-line” workers (including many technical and production staff) can be essential to output quality yet remain less visible and less publicly credited, which in turn shapes how their work is perceived and rewarded (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).

Within this hierarchy, the valuation of presenters (and other on-screen talent) is strongly tied to visibility and the perception of individual authorship or personality, while producers are more often evaluated through internal organisational metrics, managerial trust, and the successful delivery of programmes under constraints (time, budget, compliance). Production-culture research documents how workers themselves understand and narrate these hierarchies, and how industrial rituals, branding logics, and discourses of “authorship” can attach symbolic worth unevenly across roles frequently privileging those whose contribution is easier to individualise and market (Caldwell, 2008).

Empirical work on creative labour more broadly also supports the view that media work often combines high identity-investment with insecure conditions and uneven reward structures. In such contexts, symbolic reward (prestige, reputation, credit) can partially substitute for stable

economic reward, but tends to concentrate among roles that are publicly legible and institutionally recognised (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011). (Politeknik Tempo Jakarta)

### **2.3.2 Crediting and recognition: what the evidence shows (and what it rarely measures)**

A practical mechanism linking visibility to valuation is crediting: whose name appears, where, and with what prominence. Production studies argue that credits operate as an “industrial grammar” of contribution, making some work legible and other work marginal (Mayer, 2011; Caldwell, 2008). However, a limitation in the empirical literature is that many studies describe hierarchies and invisibilities but do not quantify how crediting patterns map onto salary, promotion pathways, or decision-making power inside organisations especially in non-US contexts. This matters for your study because the producer–presenter valuation gap is not only about who is “important”, but about how visibility and credit become convertible into organisational and economic outcomes.

### **2.3.3 Visibility as convertible capital: why presenters often gain leverage**

A strong explanatory thread in the global literature is that media visibility can be converted into other advantages status, influence, and income streams beyond salary. Driessens (2013) theorises “celebrity capital” as accumulated media visibility that is potentially convertible into other forms of capital (economic, social, political), and distinguishes it from symbolic capital (legitimate recognition within a field).

For presenters, this logic is empirically supported by work on how public-facing media professionals cultivate personas and follower relationships that become marketable assets.

Related evidence comes from journalism and social media performance studies: Mellado and Hermida’s (2021) empirical work (content analysis of journalists’ social media posts) shows how journalists can perform “promoter”, “celebrity”, and “joker” roles, roles that extend beyond institutional news norms and explicitly leverage personal identity and audience attention. While this is not “presenters vs producers” directly, it demonstrates an empirically observed pathway by which on-air or public-facing workers can grow recognisability and reshape professional value through visibility precisely the mechanism your conceptual model needs to test in Ghanaian broadcasting.

### **2.3.4 Africa-wide evidence: informality, precarity, and relationship-based production**

Across African screen and media industries, empirical studies repeatedly emphasise informality, network-based hiring, and precarity as structural conditions shaping labour outcomes. A useful case is Nollywood’s evolving streaming (“portal film”) market: Simon

(2022) draws on interviews with industry stakeholders and argues that pervasive precarity leads workers to rely on informal social relations and “hope labour” (continuing to work under uncertainty in anticipation of future returns). This evidence matters for your dissertation because it suggests that in many African contexts, labour valuation may be less determined by formal job ladders and more by visibility, relationships, and perceived market pull. That combination can plausibly privilege presenters (who can demonstrate audience attraction) over producers (whose contribution is harder to “sell” externally), unless organisations have strong internal recognition systems.

At the same time, Africa-focused evidence is uneven: we have rich accounts of production informality and precarious labour, but fewer studies that isolate crediting norms (who is named, who is not) as a mechanism that links backstage work to career progression and pay. That gap is particularly relevant to your producer/presenter comparison.

### ***2.3.5 Ghana evidence on media structure and working conditions***

For Ghana, the strongest accessible evidence based on labour conditions and structural pressures comes from major sector reports and Ghana-based scholarship.

Media market size and competition pressures. MFWA’s State of Media Freedom in Ghana 2022 describes Ghana’s pluralistic media landscape and provides concrete counts of operational stations (e.g., 513 operational radio stations out of 707 authorised; 117 operational television stations out of 156 authorised as of Q4 2022).

A crowded market increases competition for advertising and attention, which tends to amplify the organisational value of audience-facing brand assets often presenters and flagship programmes especially where revenue is directly tied to ratings, sponsors, or digital engagement. (Media Foundation for West Africa [MFWA], 2023).

Working conditions and institutional support. The State of the Ghanaian Media Report (Department of Communication Studies, University of Ghana, & Media Foundation for West Africa [DCS-UG & MFWA], 2023) reports systemic working-condition problems: untransparent recruitment, lack of contracts, weak promotion structures, and very low/irregular salaries, as well as limited healthcare and counselling support. (Media Foundation for West Africa [MFWA], 2023)

The report's dedicated chapter on working conditions (Yeboah-Banin & Braimah, 2023) reinforces this with mixed-methods evidence base and explicitly notes poor pay, limited welfare (including healthcare/pensions), and the absence of codified workplace protocols in many organisations.

These conditions are directly relevant to valuation and crediting practices for two reasons:

1. Precarity sharpens competition for recognition. When pay is low and progression routes are unclear, symbolic rewards (visibility, public recognition, "being known") can become more important career currency.
2. Informal promotion logics can privilege visible roles. Where promotion is not rule-governed, the ability to demonstrate public value (audience recognition, sponsor attractiveness) may substitute for formal appraisal again plausibly advantaging presenters relative to producers unless the organisation has strong internal metrics for production labour.

### **2.3.6 Ghana evidence on branding and identity-as-commodity**

Direct Ghana-specific studies of broadcast presenters' branding are still limited in the peer-reviewed literature, but Ghanaian scholarship on personal branding and celebrity work provides a relevant empirical base for the visibility-to-value mechanism.

Khalid's (2018) University of Ghana thesis on personal branding reports interview evidence from management teams of Ghanaian celebrities and finds that personal brands are managed for marketing reasons, with celebrities viewing identity as a commodity that can generate social and economic returns. Even though this evidence is not limited to broadcasting, it supports the plausibility that Ghana's media-facing professionals (including presenters) can translate recognition and visibility into economic opportunities (endorsements, event hosting, influencer work), reinforcing the structural incentive to invest in visibility labour.

### **2.3.7 Synthesis: what is established, contested, and Missing**

#### **Established (well-supported):**

1. Media labour valuation is structured by role hierarchies that make some contributions more visible and more easily credited than others (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).
2. Visibility can function as a convertible resource (celebrity capital), plausibly translating into influence and income beyond formal employment rewards (Driessens, 2013).

3. Ghanaian media conditions include informality/opacity in recruitment and promotion, weak contracts, and low/irregular pay—an environment where symbolic rewards and visibility may become especially salient (Department of Communication Studies, University of Ghana, & Media Foundation for West Africa [DCS-UG & MFWA], 2023; Yeboah-Banin & Braimah, 2023). (Media Foundation for West Africa [MFWA], 2023)

**Contested (mixed or context-dependent):**

1. Whether visibility should drive valuation is debated implicitly in labour scholarship: some accounts treat visibility-based reward as a market reality; others argue it masks collective labour and entrenches inequities (especially for “below-the-line” workers) (Caldwell, 2008; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).

2. The direction of causality is not always clear: are presenters valued because they are visible, or are they made visible because organisations decide they are valuable? Your Ghana case study can empirically probe this by examining internal decision processes alongside external crediting and audience recognition.

**Missing:**

1. Ghana-specific empirical evidence that directly compares producers and presenters on: (a) how recognition is defined, (b) how credit is allocated (on-air mentions, programme credits, social media tagging, corporate communications), and (c) how these translate into organisational outcomes (pay, promotion, job security, influence in editorial decisions). Existing Ghana reports establish the labour climate but do not isolate producer–presenter valuation as a specific comparative problem. (Media Foundation for West Africa [MFWA], 2023)

2. Crediting as a measurable organisational practice in Ghanaian broadcasting: what rules (formal or informal) govern who is named, who is thanked publicly, and who is positioned as “the face” of a programme. Production studies argue this matters, but Ghana-focused measurement is scarce.

3. Conversion pathways in Ghana: We have evidence that personal branding generates economic and social returns in Ghanaian celebrity work (Khalid, 2018), but limited evidence mapping how broadcast visibility specifically converts into remuneration or bargaining power inside media houses (e.g., presenter salary premiums, sponsorship-linked bonuses, preferential contracts).

## 2.4 Conclusion

The preceding review establishes that valuation in media industries is routinely structured by visibility regimes, institutionalised crediting practices, and hierarchies of labour. Production studies demonstrate that backstage work is often essential yet systematically less visible and less readily credited, while on-air labour is more easily personalised and publicly attributed (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).

At the same time, scholarship on celebrity/visibility shows that public recognisability can operate as a convertible resource that may translate into broader advantages (Driessens, 2013).

For Ghana, sector-level evidence indicates an environment of weak contracts, opaque promotion structures, and low/irregular remuneration conditions under which symbolic recognition and informal organisational logics can become particularly consequential (DCS-UG & MFWA, 2023; Yeboah-Banin & Braimah, 2023).

However, important gaps remain in how these dynamics are evidenced and specified for producer–presenter valuation in Ghanaian media organisations.

**Gap 1:** Limited integrated evidence comparing producers and presenters across the full valuation triad (O1; RQ1)

Existing empirical work strongly supports the general proposition that media labour is hierarchically valued, with public-facing roles often receiving greater symbolic attention than backstage roles (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).

Yet the literature rarely offers a single, integrated analysis that compares producers and presenters simultaneously across economic value (remuneration/security), symbolic value (recognition/status), and organisational value (authority/influence), particularly in Ghana. Ghana-focused sector reports describe difficult labour conditions, but they do not typically disaggregate valuation dynamics at the level of producer versus presenter roles in a way that directly answers RQ1.

Why this matters for your hypotheses: this gap makes it necessary to empirically test whether, and in what ways, presenters receive higher symbolic recognition than producers (H1) and whether producers retain influence without equivalent public recognition (H2).

**Gap 2:** Crediting practices are theorised as consequential but under-documented as measurable organisational routines in Ghana (O2; RQ2; H2)

The literature clarifies that crediting is not a neutral listing of contributions but a practice through which industries signal authorship, hierarchy, and legitimacy (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).

However, Ghana-focused research rarely documents how credit is operationalised within media organisations: for example, who gets named in programme credits, promo materials, social media captions, internal communications, and award submissions and who decides these attributions. Without such evidence, RQ2 cannot be answered using existing scholarship alone, and H2 (influence without proportional credit/recognition) remains plausible but under-specified for the Ghanaian setting.

Implication: there is a clear need for organisation-level evidence on both formal crediting (credits, titles, official acknowledgements) and informal crediting (on-air praise, managerial narratives, audience attribution) and on how these patterns differ between producers and presenters.

**Gap 3:** The visibility–value link is recognised conceptually but not adequately tested in Ghanaian media workplaces (O3; RQ3; H1; H3)

Work on celebrity/visibility supports the view that recognisability can function as a convertible resource (Driessens, 2013), and Ghana-based research on personal branding indicates that visibility and identity may be deliberately managed for social and economic returns.

Yet existing evidence does not adequately establish, for Ghanaian media organisations, whether perceived professional value is more strongly associated with visibility than with the extent of production labour, as posited in H3, nor does it clarify the organisational pathways through which visibility translates into recognition, remuneration, or authority.

Implication: to answer RQ3 rigorously, the study must examine (i) how producers and presenters themselves describe the relationship between visibility and value and (ii) how organisational decision-makers interpret and reward visibility relative to backstage contribution.

**Gap 4:** Institutional explanations are present in broad form but thinly evidenced for Ghana-specific producer–presenter valuation dynamics (O4)

Ghana sector reports provide important context about labour conditions and organisational fragility. However, they do not fully explain which institutional mechanisms (e.g., branding strategy, audience metrics, organisational hierarchy, HR/pay practices, promotion pathways) systematically produce valuation differences between producers and presenters.

In other words, the literature describes the ecosystem pressures, but it rarely specifies how these pressures become organisational routines that determine who is rewarded, credited, and empowered.

Implication: Objective 4 requires organisation-level evidence that links valuation outcomes to identifiable institutional factors, rather than treating valuation as a diffuse cultural phenomenon.

## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter explains the methodology I used to investigate how media producers and presenters are valued in Ghana's broadcast media industry, with particular attention to differences in economic value (pay and security), symbolic value (crediting and recognition), and organisational value (decision-making influence). It presents the research design, approach and method; the study setting and population; sampling and sample sizes; data collection instruments and procedures; data analysis techniques; strategies for rigour/trustworthiness; ethical considerations; and the limitations of the methodology.

#### 3.1 Research Design

I adopted a qualitative-dominant mixed-methods design within a single-case study of Media General Ghana Limited (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017; Yin, 2017). The mixed-methods design was appropriate because the research problem combines (a) measurable patterns in how producers and presenters perceive valuation and crediting and (b) deeper explanations of how these patterns are produced and sustained in organisational practice (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017).

The quantitative strand comprised a structured questionnaire administered to a wider pool of eligible producers and presenters in the organisation. This strand provided descriptive and comparative patterns (for example, producers versus presenters) on remuneration, job security, recognition/crediting, perceived organisational influence, and professional satisfaction.

The qualitative strand comprised open-ended questions that explored how participants interpreted valuation and recognition, how crediting practices operated in daily work, and how visibility shaped perceived status and opportunities (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

#### 3.2 Research Approach

The study followed an interpretivist approach, treating valuation, recognition, and professional worth as socially constructed and shaped by organisational culture, industry norms, and everyday interactions (Schwandt, 2015). This perspective supported the qualitative emphasis

of the study, while still allowing the questionnaire to summarise participants' reported perceptions and experiences in a structured manner.

I used an inductive analytic orientation in the qualitative strand. Rather than testing fixed categories only, I allowed themes to emerge from participants' accounts while remaining guided by the study objectives (economic, symbolic, and organisational valuation) (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017).

### **3.3 Research Method**

I used a case study method, focusing on Media General Ghana Limited as a single organisational case that spans television, radio, and digital media brands under one corporate group (Yin, 2017). The case study approach enabled me to examine valuation and crediting practices in their natural organisational context, including how roles were structured, how recognition was allocated, and how status was communicated internally and publicly.

The mixed-methods strategy was implemented sequentially: I administered questionnaires first to establish descriptive patterns, followed by open-ended questions to explain and interpret those patterns in depth (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017).

### **3.4 Population of the Study**

The population for this study comprised media producers and media presenters working within Media General Ghana Limited. These two occupational groups were the focus because the study examines how valuation differs between largely behind-the-scenes production labour and front-facing presentation labour, including how visibility influences recognition and perceived worth.

### **3.5 Sample and Sampling Technique**

I used purposive sampling to recruit participants who could provide relevant, experience-based evidence about labour valuation and crediting practices (Palinkas et al., 2015). Eligibility was based on participants' current roles as either producers or presenters within the organisation and their direct experience with production and/or on-air presentation work.

To ensure a breadth of perspectives, I applied maximum variation considerations within the purposive approach, aiming for diversity across gender, department/unit (including news and other programming areas), years of experience, and rank and responsibility level.

The questionnaire was administered to a wider pool of eligible producers and presenters than the interview sample. A total of 20 completed questionnaires were retrieved and included in the descriptive analysis.

### **3.6 Research Setting (Media General)**

The research was conducted at Media General Ghana Limited, a major Ghanaian media organisation operating multiple brands across broadcast and digital platforms, including TV3 Network Limited, Onua TV and Onua FM, 3FM, and 3News.com.

Media General was an appropriate case because it contains clear producer–presenter role differentiation and a competitive brand environment in which visibility, audience connection, and on-air identity are central to organisational branding. This context made it suitable for examining how recognition, crediting, and professional value are distributed across occupational roles.

### **3.7 Data Collection**

I used a structured questionnaire as the data collection instrument (included in the study appendices).

#### **3.7.1 Structured Questionnaire**

I used a self-administered paper questionnaire designed to capture perceptions and experiences related to valuation and recognition among producers and presenters. The questionnaire required approximately 8–12 minutes to complete and was anonymous to encourage candid responses.

It comprised the following sections: Section A (role and work context), Section B (economic value), Section C (symbolic value), Section D (organisational value and power), Section E (visibility capital), Section F (role identity and fairness), and Section G (open-ended items on crediting practices and suggested reforms).

### **3.8 Data Collection Procedure**

I followed a sequential process. I sought and obtained permission to conduct the study within Media General and complied with institutional requirements for ethical research conduct.

Questionnaire administration: I administered the questionnaire as a paper-based, self-administered instrument in the workplace. I distributed questionnaires directly to eligible producers and presenters through in-person contact and, where necessary, follow-up communication via workplace-appropriate channels (including WhatsApp and email) to facilitate retrieval. Participation was voluntary and anonymous, and respondents indicated consent on the questionnaire before proceeding.

Data management: I anonymised interview and questionnaire data by removing direct identifiers and used role-based descriptors (e.g., 'Producer, mid-level') where needed to preserve confidentiality while retaining analytical meaning. Data were stored securely and used solely for academic purposes.

### **3.9 Data Analysis Techniques**

I analysed the two data sets separately and then integrated findings during interpretation.

Questionnaire analysis (descriptive): I analysed questionnaire data using descriptive statistics to summarise distributions and compare patterns between producers and presenters. This included frequencies and percentages for categorical items and summary patterns for Likert-scale responses, with particular attention to contrasts across economic value, symbolic recognition/crediting, organisational influence, and perceived fairness.

Integration of quantitative and qualitative findings: I integrated the two strands during interpretation by comparing descriptive questionnaire patterns with interview themes to assess areas of convergence, complementarity, and divergence, thereby strengthening explanation within the case context (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017).

### **3.10 Trustworthiness of the Study**

To strengthen the quality and credibility of the qualitative findings, I applied trustworthiness principles associated with naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Transferability: I provided a detailed description of the organisational setting, participant role categories, and study procedures so that readers can judge the applicability of findings to comparable Ghanaian media contexts.

Dependability: I maintained an audit trail of research decisions, recruitment steps, and analytic procedures, including how codes and themes were developed and refined.

Confirmability: I grounded interpretations in participants' accounts and used systematic coding to reduce the influence of personal assumptions. The comparison of survey patterns with interview themes also helped check interpretations against multiple forms of evidence.

### **3.11 Ethical Considerations**

I conducted the study in line with institutional ethical requirements.

Informed consent: Participation in the questionnaire was voluntary. Participants received information about the study's purpose and their rights before consenting.

Confidentiality and anonymity: The questionnaire was anonymous. Interview data were anonymised during transcription and reporting. I avoided using information that could identify individuals and used role-based labels where necessary.

Right to withdraw: Participants were informed that they could decline to answer any question and could withdraw from the study without penalty.

### **3.12 Limitations of the Methodology**

This methodology had several limitations.

Single-case scope: Focusing on one media group enabled depth but limits the extent to which findings can be generalised across Ghana's entire media industry. The value of the study lies primarily in analytical insights rather than statistical generalisation (Yin, 2017).

Self-report bias: Questionnaires rely on participants' accounts, which may be influenced by recall limitations or social desirability, especially when discussing workplace recognition and remuneration.

Organisational sensitivities: Participants may have moderated responses due to concerns about workplace relationships or consequences, despite assurances of confidentiality.

Descriptive quantitative strand: The questionnaire analysis was descriptive and intended to identify patterns within the case context, not to support causal or population-level inference.

### **3.13 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I described the qualitative-dominant mixed-methods case study design used to examine labour valuation among producers and presenters within Media General Ghana Limited. I explained the population and purposive sampling strategy, the questionnaire, sequential data collection procedures, and descriptive and thematic analysis methods. The chapter also outlined strategies for trustworthiness and ethical safeguards, and it acknowledged methodological limitations. The next chapter presents the results and analysis of the study.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the study findings from the questionnaire survey. Results are organised by the study objectives, combining descriptive summaries with exploratory role-group comparisons (presenters versus producers) and association tests among key indices. Tables and figures are embedded at the point of first mention to support transparent interpretation.

#### 4.2 Respondent profile and analytic approach

This chapter reports results from the questionnaire survey, drawing on 20 valid responses (N = 20). The sample comprised an even split between presenters/hosts/anchors (n = 10, 50%) and producers (n = 10, 50%), where the producer category included show producers (n = 7) as well as news, technical, and line producers (n = 3). All respondents reported work in television (n = 20, 100%), with some indicating additional involvement in digital/online platforms (n = 4, 20%) and radio (n = 1, 5%) (multi-select). Most participants were employed in private/commercial organisations (n = 19, 95%), with one respondent from a community/NGO/non-profit organisation (n = 1, 5%). Employment arrangements were primarily permanent staff (n = 12, 60%), followed by contract staff (n = 5, 25%), part-time (n = 2, 10%), and freelance/independent contracting (n = 1, 5%). Experience in media work was distributed across bands: 1–3 years (n = 7, 35%), 4–6 years (n = 5, 25%), 7–10 years (n = 6, 30%), and 11–15 years (n = 2, 10%). Typical weekly workload varied, with <20 hours (n = 6, 30%), 20–39 hours (n = 5, 25%), 40–49 hours (n = 5, 25%), 50–59 hours (n = 2, 10%), and 60+ hours (n = 2, 10%) reported. Monthly earnings were captured in bands: 2,000–3,499 (n = 5, 25%), 3,500–4,999 (n = 5, 25%), 5,000–7,499 (n = 4, 20%), 7,500+ (n = 2, 10%), while 20% preferred not to disclose (n = 4).

Analytically, results are organised according to the study objectives, combining descriptive reporting with exploratory between-group comparisons and association tests. For Likert-type items (primarily 1–5), results are summarised using means (M) and standard deviations (SD) alongside medians (Mdn) and interquartile ranges (IQR), to reflect both central tendency and dispersion. Composite indices were constructed to support objective-led interpretation by averaging conceptually related items (e.g., economic valuation, symbolic recognition,

organisational value/power, visibility capital), while the crediting index summarised frequency of being named across multiple publicity channels (coded on a three-point frequency scale). Given the small sample and the ordinal nature of responses, role-group comparisons use Mann–Whitney U tests with effect sizes reported as  $r$  (treated as indicative rather than definitive), and relationships between key constructs are examined using Spearman’s rank-order correlations ( $\rho$ ) with corresponding p-values (two-tailed,  $\alpha = .05$ ). Open-ended responses are incorporated through a brief thematic synthesis to contextualise the quantitative patterns; where non-response occurred in open-ended items, quantitative analyses still draw on complete item-level data for the closed-ended measures. (Field, 2017; Pallant, 2020; Conover, 1999).

### **4.3 Objective 1: Economic, symbolic, and organisational valuation of producers and presenters**

This section reports respondents’ assessments of how producers and presenters are valued across three-dimension economic valuation, symbolic recognition, and organisational value/power and considers the implications for H1 and H2. Item-level descriptives are presented in Tables 4.1, 4.3 and 4.5, while the corresponding composite indices are summarised in Tables 4.2, 4.4 and 4.6 and visualised in Figures 4.1–4.3. (Bourdieu, 1986; Caldwell, 2008; Goffman, 1959; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).

#### **4.3.1 Economic valuation (economic value)**

Overall, the economic indicators suggest a mixed economic environment, with comparatively stronger agreement on pay timeliness but weaker agreement on pay-responsibility fit and ability to negotiate. As shown in Table 4.1, respondents were more likely to agree that pay is received on time ( $M = 3.55$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ) than that pay is commensurate with responsibilities ( $M = 2.45$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ;  $Mdn = 2$ ,  $IQR = 3$ ). The lowest-rated item concerned negotiating improved pay/terms when responsibilities increase ( $M = 2.10$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ;  $Mdn = 1$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ), indicating limited perceived bargaining power in the workplace.


**Table 0-1: Economic valuation items (Likert 1–5) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney tests**

| Item  | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| My pay is received on time.                                 | 3.55 (1.36)       | 4 [2]                | 3.80 (0.92)         | 4 [2]                  | 3.30 (1.70)        | 4 [3]                 | 0.582              | 0.150           |
| My pay is commensurate with my responsibilities.            | 2.45 (1.36)       | 2 [3]                | 2.90 (1.37)         | 3 [2]                  | 2.00 (1.25)        | 2 [2]                 | 0.147              | 0.380           |
| My employment arrangement provides reasonable job security. | 3.10 (1.21)       | 3 [2]                | 3.80 (1.03)         | 4 [2]                  | 2.40 (0.97)        | 2 [1]                 | 0.0112             | 0.659           |
| I can negotiate pay/terms when responsibilities increase.   | 2.10 (1.45)       | 1 [2]                | 2.90 (1.60)         | 3 [3]                  | 1.30 (0.67)        | 1 [0]                 | 0.0160             | 0.590           |

Role-group comparisons point to a consistent pattern in which presenters report higher economic valuation than producers, particularly on job security and negotiability. Presenters rated employment-related job security more positively ( $M = 3.80$ ,  $SD = 1.03$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ) than producers ( $M = 2.40$ ,  $SD = 0.97$ ;  $Mdn = 2$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ), with an exploratory Mann–Whitney test indicating a difference in the expected direction ( $p = .011$ ; rank-biserial  $r = .66$ ; Table 4.1).

Presenters also reported substantially greater ability to negotiate pay/terms ( $M = 2.90$ ,  $SD = 1.60$ ;  $Mdn = 3$ ,  $IQR = 3$ ) than producers ( $M = 1.30$ ,  $SD = 0.67$ ;  $Mdn = 1$ ,  $IQR = 0$ ), again with an exploratory difference ( $p = .016$ ;  $r = .59$ ; Table 4.1). By contrast, perceptions of pay timeliness were broadly similar (presenters:  $M = 3.80$ ,  $SD = 0.92$ ; producers:  $M = 3.30$ ,  $SD = 1.70$ ;  $p = .583$ ).

At the index level, the pattern is clearer. The Economic Value Index (mean of four items) was moderate overall ( $M = 2.80$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ;  $Mdn = 3$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ), but presenters scored higher ( $M = 3.35$ ,  $SD = 1.01$ ;  $Mdn = 3$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ) than producers ( $M = 2.25$ ,  $SD = 0.84$ ;  $Mdn = 2$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ), with an exploratory difference ( $p = .027$ ;  $r = .59$ ; Table 4.2). The distributional separation is also visible in Figure 4.1, where presenters' scores cluster at higher values, while producers' scores sit lower with less overlap at the centre.



**Figure 0-1: Economic Value Index by role (1–5)**

**Table 0-2: Economic Value Index (mean of 4 items) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney test.**

| Item                                   | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Economic Value Index (mean of 4 items) | 2.80 (1.07)       | 3 [1]                | 3.35 (1.01)         | 3 [1]                  | 2.25 (0.84)        | 2 [1]                 | 0.0274             | 0.590           |

Substantively, these results suggest that respondents perceive economic rewards and protections (especially job security and scope for negotiation) to be more favourable for presenters than for producers. This implies that economic valuation may be tied, at least in part, to the role’s market-facing leverage and perceived replaceability. (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).

Although economic valuation is not the core of H1 (symbolic recognition), it provides context for H2: even if producers hold substantial organisational influence (tested in Section 4.3.3), that influence does not appear to translate into comparable economic security or bargaining capacity. This economic pattern, therefore, supports the broader logic of H2 in suggesting a potential disjuncture between backstage contribution and institutional reward.

#### **4.3.2 Symbolic recognition (symbolic valuation)**

Symbolic valuation was generally high across the sample, with respondents tending to agree that contributions are recognised internally and, to a slightly lesser extent, publicly. In Table 4.3, internal recognition by managers/colleagues recorded the highest overall rating ( $M = 3.70$ ,  $SD = 0.98$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ). Public acknowledgement (e.g., on-air mentions, credits, promos) was also rated positively ( $M = 3.50$ ,  $SD = 1.43$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ). Perceived fairness in credit for programme success was similarly moderate-to-high overall ( $M = 3.50$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ).


**Table 0-3: Symbolic valuation items (Likert 1–5) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney tests**

| Item  | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| In my organisation, my contribution is publicly acknowledged (e.g., on-air mention/credits/promos). | 3.50 (1.43)       | 4 [2]                | 3.70 (1.25)         | 4 [2]                  | 3.30 (1.64)        | 4 [3]                 | 0.725            | 0.099           |
| In my organisation, my contribution is recognised internally (by managers/colleagues).              | 3.70 (0.98)       | 4 [1]                | 3.50 (0.97)         | 3 [1]                  | 3.90 (0.99)        | 4 [2]                 | 0.343            | -0.25           |
| Compared with other roles, my role receives a fair share of credit for programme success.           | 3.50 (1.24)       | 4 [2]                | 4.00 (1.05)         | 4 [2]                  | 3.00 (1.25)        | 3 [2]                 | 0.079            | 0.46            |

Comparing roles, presenters reported somewhat higher symbolic recognition on two of the three indicators, particularly the perception that their role receives a fair share of credit for programme success (presenters:  $M = 4.00$ ,  $SD = 1.05$ ; producers:  $M = 3.00$ ,  $SD = 1.25$ ; exploratory  $p = .080$ ; rank-biserial  $r = .46$ ; Table 4.3). However, this advantage was not consistent across all symbolic indicators: producers rated internal recognition slightly higher (producers:  $M = 3.90$ ,  $SD = 0.99$ ; presenters:  $M = 3.50$ ,  $SD = 0.97$ ;  $p = .343$ ), and public acknowledgement was broadly similar (presenters:  $M = 3.70$ ,  $SD = 1.25$ ; producers:  $M = 3.30$ ,  $SD = 1.64$ ;  $p = .726$ ).

The Symbolic Recognition Index (mean of three items) indicates a modest presenter advantage overall—presenters:  $M = 3.73$ ,  $SD = 0.78$ ; producers:  $M = 3.40$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ —but with substantial overlap and no clear exploratory group difference ( $p = .468$ ; Table 4.4). This overlap

is evident in Figure 4.2, where both groups' distributions centre around higher values (near 4), with producers showing greater dispersion.



***Figure 0-2: Symbolic Recognition Index by role (1-5)***

**Table 0-4: Symbolic Recognition Index (mean of 3 items) by role: overall and role-group description with exploratory Mann–Whitney test.**

| Item   | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Symbolic Recognition Index (mean of 3 items) | 3.57 (0.94)       | 4 [2]                | 3.73 (0.78)         | 4 [1]                  | 3.40 (1.09)        | 4 [2]                 | 0.468              | 0.2             |

In practical terms, symbolic recognition appears to operate in two partially distinct registers: (1) internal recognition (where producers may fare as well as, or slightly better than, presenters), and (2) perceived fairness of public credit for programme success, where presenters report an advantage. This suggests symbolic valuation is not uniformly “frontstage-driven”; rather, recognition can be distributed differently depending on whether it is anchored in organisational relations or public-facing visibility. (Bourdieu, 1986; Goffman, 1959).

H1 anticipates a symbolic advantage for presenters due to their visibility. The results are directionally consistent with H1 (presenters’ symbolic index is higher), and the clearest divergence concerns the fair share of credit for programme success. However, the lack of a clear role-group difference at the composite index level and producers’ slightly higher internal recognition complicates a strong reading of H1. For H2, the symbolic findings also point to a potential mismatch: producers can be recognised internally yet still perceive lower fairness in credit relative to other roles, which aligns with the proposition that backstage work may be undervalued in public credit systems (a point developed further in Section 4.4 on crediting practices).

### 4.3.3 Organisational valuation/power (organisational value)


Respondents' reports indicate that influence within the organisation is most visible in planning and editorial input, while formal authority to approve or reject content is comparatively weaker. As shown in Table 4.5, overall agreement was high for having meaningful input into programme planning ( $M = 3.85$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ) and editorial decisions ( $M = 3.70$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ). By contrast, authority to approve or reject content on editorial/compliance grounds was notably lower ( $M = 2.80$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ;  $Mdn = 3$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ), suggesting that decision influence does not necessarily imply formal veto power.

**Table 0-5: Organisational valuation/power items (Likert 1–5) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney tests**

| Item   | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| I have meaningful input into programme editorial decisions (topics, angles, guests).         | 3.70 (1.30)       | 4 [2]                | 3.20 (1.55)         | 3 [2]                  | 4.20 (0.79)        | 4 [1]                 | 0.146              | -0.379          |
| I have meaningful input into programme planning (rundown, timing, format).                   | 3.85 (1.14)       | 4 [2]                | 3.40 (1.35)         | 3 [2]                  | 4.30 (0.67)        | 4 [1]                 | 0.114              | -0.409          |
| I have the authority to approve or reject content/guests on editorial or compliance grounds. | 2.80 (1.11)       | 3 [1]                | 2.60 (1.07)         | 3 [1]                  | 3.00 (1.15)        | 3 [2]                 | 0.502              | -0.179          |

Across all organisational items, producers reported higher organisational value/power than presenters. Producers rated their input into editorial decisions higher ( $M = 4.20, SD = 0.79$ ; presenters:  $M = 3.20, SD = 1.55$ ;  $p = .146$ ) and similarly reported higher input into planning ( $M = 4.30, SD = 0.67$ ; presenters:  $M = 3.40, SD = 1.35$ ;  $p = .114$ ). Differences in formal authority were smaller but still favoured producers (producers:  $M = 3.00, SD = 1.15$ ; presenters:  $M = 2.60, SD = 1.07$ ;  $p = .503$ ). Although these are exploratory comparisons and not definitive, the direction is consistent across indicators.

At the index level, the Organisational Value/Power Index (mean of three items) was higher for producers ( $M = 3.83, SD = 0.72$ ;  $Mdn = 4, IQR = 1$ ) than for presenters ( $M = 3.07, SD = 1.22$ ;  $Mdn = 3, IQR = 1$ ), with an exploratory  $p = .171$  (Table 4.6). The separation is visually apparent in Figure 4.3, where producers' distribution is shifted upward and more tightly clustered around higher values.



**Figure 0-3: Organisational Value/Power Index by role (1–5)**

**Table 0-6: Organisational Value/Power Index (mean of 3 items) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney test.**

| Item   | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Organisational Value/Power Index (mean of 3 items) | 3.45 (1.05)       | 4 [1]                | 3.07 (1.22)         | 3 [1]                  | 3.83 (0.72)        | 4 [1]                 | 0.171              | -0.370          |

These results imply that producers are positioned closer to programme construction and control (planning and editorial shaping), whereas presenters’ organisational influence appears more variable. In other words, backstage roles may carry substantial operational and editorial weight even when they are not the public face of the programme. (Caldwell, 2008; Goffman, 1959).

This dimension directly speaks to the first part of H2: producers report greater organisational influence/value than presenters, consistent with the premise that producers “make” the programme in material and editorial terms. When considered alongside the earlier economic pattern (Section 4.3.1) where producers report lower economic valuation these findings reinforce the broader H2 logic that backstage influence does not necessarily convert into commensurate reward or recognition. At the same time, because symbolic recognition differences are modest (Section 4.3.2), the H2 proposition about lower public credit is best evaluated using the explicit crediting measures in Section 4.4.

Taken together, the results show a structured contrast: presenters appear advantaged economically, producers appear advantaged organisationally, and symbolic recognition is comparatively high for both groups, but with signs of presenter advantage in perceived credit fairness. This configuration sets up the next analytical step: examining whether visibility and crediting practices help explain why organisational contribution does not translate evenly into recognition and reward.

## 4.4 Objective 2: Crediting practices and the role of visibility in valuation

This section examines (i) how frequently producers and presenters are credited across organisational publicity channels, and (ii) how visibility capital relates to symbolic recognition, crediting, and selected outcome perceptions. Given the small sample (N = 20), statistical tests are treated as exploratory, and correlations are interpreted cautiously as pattern evidence rather than definitive causal relationships.

### 4.4.1 Crediting frequency across publicity channels


Across the sample, reported crediting practices show a marked role differentiation. As summarised in Table 4.7, presenters consistently reported being credited often or sometimes across all four channels assessed (on-air credits/verbal mention; organisational social media; promotional posters/flyers; press interviews/publicity). In each channel, 50% of presenters reported being credited often and 50% sometimes (with 0% never).

**Table 0-7: Frequency of crediting across publicity channels by role (Never/Sometimes/Often), n (%).**

| Role      | Publicity channel                           | Never (%) | n | Sometimes (%) | n | Often (%) | n |
|-----------|---|-----------|---|---------------|---|-----------|---|
| Presenter | a) On-air credits / verbal mention          | 0 (0%)    |   | 5 (50%)       |   | 5 (50%)   |   |
| Producer  | a) On-air credits / verbal mention          | 1 (10%)   |   | 6 (60%)       |   | 3 (30%)   |   |
| Presenter | b) Social media posts from the organisation | 0 (0%)    |   | 5 (50%)       |   | 5 (50%)   |   |
| Producer  | b) Social media posts from the organisation | 6 (60%)   |   | 4 (40%)       |   | 0 (0%)    |   |
| Presenter | c) Promotional posters/flyers               | 0 (0%)    |   | 5 (50%)       |   | 5 (50%)   |   |
| Producer  | c) Promotional posters/flyers               | 10 (100%) |   | 0 (0%)        |   | 0 (0%)    |   |
| Presenter | d) Press interviews/publicity               | 0 (0%)    |   | 5 (50%)       |   | 5 (50%)   |   |
| Producer  | d) Press interviews/publicity               | 9 (90%)   |   | 1 (10%)       |   | 0 (0%)    |   |

By contrast, producers reported substantially lower visibility in formal crediting systems, particularly in external-facing promotional contexts (Table 4.7). For producers, crediting was most common on-air (30% often; 60% sometimes; 10% never), but dropped sharply in organisational social media (60% never; 40% sometimes; 0% often). The strongest exclusion appeared in promotional posters/flyers (100% never) and press interviews/publicity (90% never; 10% sometimes; 0% often). This indicates that producers' contributions are least likely to be publicly attached to their names when the organisation is promoting programmes and personalities to audiences and external stakeholders.

The index summary reinforces this divide. The Crediting Index (mean across four channels; Never = 1, Often = 3) was higher for presenters ( $M = 2.50$ ,  $SD = 0.53$ ;  $Mdn = 2$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ) than for producers ( $M = 1.43$ ,  $SD = 0.26$ ;  $Mdn = 2$ ,  $IQR = 0$ ), with an exploratory Mann–Whitney test indicating a large separation in the expected direction ( $p < .001$ ; rank-biserial  $r = .95$ ; Table 4.8). The distributional contrast is also evident in Figure 4.4, which visualises presenters' higher crediting scores relative to producers.



**Figure 0-4: Crediting Index by role (1-3).**

**Table 0-8: Crediting Index (mean across 4 channels; Never = 1, Often = 3) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney test.**

| Item   | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Crediting Index (mean of 4 channels; Never=1, Often=3) | 1.96 (0.68)       | 2 [1]                | 2.50 (0.53)         | 2 [1]                  | 1.43 (0.26)        | 2 [0]                 | 0.0002             | 0.95            |

Substantively, these results suggest that crediting practices are structured in ways that align public recognition with the frontstage role. Even where producers contribute substantially to programme development (as indicated by higher organisational value/power in Section 4.2.3), their names are comparatively absent from routine publicity and promotional materials. This pattern provides direct support for the “lower formal/public credit” component of H2, and offers a plausible mechanism through which backstage labour may remain less visible in organisational narratives of programme success. (Caldwell, 2008; Goffman, 1959).

#### 4.4.2 Visibility capital and associations with recognition and credit

Respondents reported strong agreement that visibility matters within organisational opportunity structures. In Table 4.9, the highest-rated visibility item was the belief that a strong personal public profile improves bargaining power ( $M = 4.45$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ ;  $Mdn = 5$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ). Respondents also tended to agree that audience recognition affects professional opportunities in their organisation ( $M = 4.10$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 2$ ). On experiential items, perceptions were more mixed: respondents reported moderate agreement that they had experienced increased opportunities due to visibility ( $M = 3.50$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ) and moderate agreement that low visibility can reduce recognition/opportunity ( $M = 3.35$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ;  $Mdn = 3$ ,  $IQR = 3$ ). (Thompson, 2005; Bourdieu, 1986).

**Table 0-9: Visibility capital items (Likert 1–5) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney tests**

| Item  | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW P (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| I believe audience recognition strongly affects professional opportunities in my organisation.                        | 4.10 (1.07)       | 4 [2]                | 4.40 (1.07)         | 5 [1]                  | 3.80 (1.03)        | 4 [2]                 | 0.153              | 0.36            |
| Having a strong personal public profile (e.g., followers, recognizability) improves a worker's bargaining power here. | 4.45 (1.00)       | 5 [1]                | 4.50 (0.97)         | 5 [1]                  | 4.40 (1.07)        | 5 [1]                 | 0.96               | 0.020           |
| I have personally experienced increased opportunities due to visibility (e.g., better slots, endorsements, leverage). | 3.50 (1.24)       | 4 [1]                | 3.90 (0.88)         | 4 [2]                  | 3.10 (1.45)        | 3 [2]                 | 0.223              | 0.32            |
| I have personally experienced reduced recognition/opportunity due to low visibility.                                  | 3.35 (1.39)       | 3 [3]                | 2.90 (1.45)         | 3 [2]                  | 3.80 (1.23)        | 4 [2]                 | 0.174              | -0.360          |

Role-group differences on individual visibility items were directionally plausible but not decisive. Presenters rated audience recognition as shaping opportunities more strongly ( $M = 4.40$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ) than producers ( $M = 3.80$ ,  $SD = 1.03$ ), whereas producers more strongly endorsed having experienced reduced recognition due to low visibility ( $M = 3.80$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ) relative to presenters ( $M = 2.90$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ) (Table 4.9). At the index level, however, both groups were broadly similar: the Visibility Capital/Impact Index averaged 3.85 overall ( $SD =$

0.70), with only a modest difference between presenters ( $M = 3.92$ ,  $SD = 0.65$ ) and producers ( $M = 3.77$ ,  $SD = 0.79$ ;  $p = .445$ ; Table 4.10). Figure 4.5 similarly shows substantial overlap between the groups.




Figure 0-5: Visibility Index by role (1–5)

Table 0-10: Visibility Index (mean of 4 items) by role: overall and role-group descriptives with exploratory Mann–Whitney test


| Item  | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Visibility Capital/Impact Index (mean of 4 items) | 3.85 (0.70)       | 4 [1]                | 3.92 (0.65)         | 4 [0]                  | 3.77 (0.79)        | 4 [1]                 | 0.444              | 0.21            |

To examine whether visibility operates as a mechanism connecting recognition and reward, Spearman correlations among indices and outcomes are reported in Table 4.11 (with corresponding  $p$ -values). In this sample, visibility showed positive associations with both symbolic recognition ( $\rho = .359$ ,  $p = .120$ ) and crediting ( $\rho = .331$ ,  $p = .155$ ), but these relationships did not reach conventional significance thresholds, and should therefore be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive (Table 4.11). The scatterplot in Figure 4.6 is consistent with a broadly positive pattern between visibility and symbolic recognition, although with notable dispersion, implying that higher visibility does not uniformly translate into higher symbolic recognition for all respondents.

**Table 0-11: Spearman rank correlations ( $\rho$ ) and  $p$ -values among key indices and outcomes.**

| <b>Panel A: Spearman's <math>\rho</math></b>       |                         |                       |                        |                       |               |                   |                       |
|--|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
|  | <b>Visibility Index</b> | <b>Symbolic Index</b> | <b>Crediting Index</b> | <b>Economic Index</b> | <b>Valued</b> | <b>FairCredit</b> | <b>Leaving Intent</b> |
| <b>Visibility Index</b>                            | 1.0                     | 0.359                 | 0.331                  | 0.194                 | 0.536         | 0.275             | 0.377                 |
| <b>Symbolic Index</b>                              | 0.359                   | 1.0                   | 0.545                  | 0.228                 | 0.582         | 0.532             | -0.059                |
| <b>Crediting Index</b>                             | 0.331                   | 0.545                 | 1.0                    | 0.431                 | 0.51          | 0.295             | -0.156                |
| <b>Economic Index</b>                              | 0.194                   | 0.228                 | 0.431                  | 1.0                   | 0.242         | 0.055             | 0.267                 |
| <b>Valued</b>                                      | 0.536                   | 0.582                 | 0.51                   | 0.242                 | 1.0           | 0.107             | 0.189                 |
| <b>FairCredit</b>                                  | 0.275                   | 0.532                 | 0.295                  | 0.055                 | 0.107         | 1.0               | -0.255                |
| <b>Leaving Intent</b>                              | 0.377                   | -0.059                | -0.156                 | 0.267                 | 0.189         | -0.255            | 1.0                   |
| <b>Panel B: <math>p</math>-values (two-tailed)</b> |                         |                       |                        |                       |               |                   |                       |

|                         | <b>Visibility Index</b> | <b>Symbolic Index</b> | <b>Crediting Index</b> | <b>Economic Index</b> | <b>Valued</b> | <b>FairCredit</b> | <b>Leaving Intent</b> |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Visibility Index</b> | 0.0                     | 0.12                  | 0.155                  | 0.413                 | 0.015         | 0.241             | 0.101                 |
| <b>Symbolic Index</b>   | 0.12                    | 0.0                   | 0.013                  | 0.334                 | 0.007         | 0.016             | 0.806                 |
| <b>Crediting Index</b>  | 0.155                   | 0.013                 | 0.0                    | 0.058                 | 0.022         | 0.206             | 0.511                 |
| <b>Economic Index</b>   | 0.413                   | 0.334                 | 0.058                  | 0.0                   | 0.304         | 0.818             | 0.256                 |
| <b>Valued</b>           | 0.015                   | 0.007                 | 0.022                  | 0.304                 | 0.0           | 0.653             | 0.424                 |
| <b>FairCredit</b>       | 0.241                   | 0.016                 | 0.206                  | 0.818                 | 0.653         | 0.0               | 0.278                 |
| <b>Leaving Intent</b>   | 0.101                   | 0.806                 | 0.511                  | 0.256                 | 0.424         | 0.278             | 0.0                   |



**Figure 0-6: Visibility Index vs Symbolic Recognition Index (1–5).**

More robustly within this dataset, visibility was moderately and significantly associated with feeling professionally valued ( $\rho = .536, p = .015$ ; Table 4.11). This suggests that respondents who reported greater visibility capital/impact also tended to report stronger feelings of professional value, even if the direct visibility–crediting and visibility–symbolic correlations were weaker. In addition, symbolic recognition was significantly associated with crediting ( $\rho = .545, p = .013$ ) and with perceptions of fair credit distribution ( $\rho = .532, p = .016$ ), while crediting was significantly associated with feeling valued ( $\rho = .510, p = .022$ ; Table 4.11). Taken together, these relationships imply a coherent cluster in which symbolic recognition, formal crediting, and perceived professional value tend to move together, with visibility appearing more tightly linked to the *experience* of being valued than to formal crediting per se in this small sample.

The results provide strong descriptive support for the “credit allocation” element of H2: producers are far less likely to be formally credited in organisational publicity channels (Table 4.5; Figure 4.5), despite reporting higher organisational influence in programme construction (Section 4.2.3). For H1, which anticipates higher symbolic recognition for presenters due to

visibility, the evidence is more mixed. Presenters are clearly advantaged in public-facing crediting, and visibility is positively related to symbolic recognition and crediting at the correlational level, but these latter associations are not statistically decisive in this dataset (Table 4.7). The overall pattern, therefore, suggests that visibility and crediting are aligned with frontstage roles, yet the pathway from visibility to symbolic recognition may be context-dependent and not uniform across individuals an issue revisited in Section 4.4 through outcome perceptions and open-ended narratives. (Thompson, 2005; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).


Overall, Objective 2 findings indicate that (i) formal crediting practices strongly favour presenters in outward-facing organisational publicity, and (ii) visibility is widely perceived as consequential for opportunity and bargaining power, with some pattern evidence linking visibility, symbolic recognition, crediting, and perceived professional value.

## **4.5 Objective 3: Perceptions and narratives of professional value and recognition**

This section brings together (a) respondents' outcome perceptions relating to feeling valued, fairness of credit distribution, and leaving intent, and (b) a thematic synthesis of open-ended responses that clarifies how "value" and "recognition" are understood and experienced in practice. Given the small sample ( $N = 20$ ), quantitative comparisons are interpreted cautiously and used primarily to illuminate patterns that are then contextualised by the qualitative accounts.

### **4.5.1 Quantitative outcome indicators**

Three outcome indicators are summarised in Table 4.12 (and Figure 4.7 for "feeling valued"). Overall, respondents reported moderate-to-positive feelings of professional value ( $M = 3.35$ ,  $SD = 1.18$ ;  $Mdn = 3$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ) and similarly moderate perceptions of fairness in the distribution of credit across roles ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ;  $Mdn = 3$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ). At the same time, respondents reported a comparatively high tendency to consider leaving their organisation due to feeling undervalued ( $M = 3.60$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ,  $IQR = 1$ ), suggesting that perceived undervaluation is not merely an abstract concern but one with potential retention implications.



**Figure 0-7: Feeling professionally valued by role (1–5).**

**Table 0-12: Outcome indicators (Likert 1–5) by role: feeling valued, perceived fairness of credit, and leaving intent.**

| Item   | Overall Mean (SD) | Overall Median [IQR] | Presenter Mean (SD) | Presenter Median [IQR] | Producer Mean (SD) | Producer Median [IQR] | MW p (exploratory) | Rank-biserial r |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| I feel professionally valued in my organisation.   | 3.35 (1.18)       | 3 [1]                | 3.60 (1.26)         | 4 [2]                  | 3.10 (1.10)        | 3 [1]                 | 0.317              | 0.26            |
| I feel the distribution of credit between roles (producer/presenter/management) is fair. | 3.25 (1.33)       | 3 [1]                | 3.30 (1.49)         | 3 [2]                  | 3.20 (1.23)        | 3 [1]                 | 0.810              | 0.069           |

|   |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |        |
|---|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|-------|--------|
| I have considered leaving my current organisation due to feeling undervalued. | 3.60<br>(1.14) | 4 [1] | 3.60<br>(0.97) | 4 [1] | 3.60<br>(1.35) | 4 [2] | 0.844 | -0.060 |
|---|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|-------|--------|

Role-group patterns were present but not pronounced. Presenters reported somewhat higher feelings of being valued (presenters:  $M = 3.60$ ,  $SD = 1.26$ ; producers:  $M = 3.10$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ), though the exploratory difference was not decisive ( $p = .318$ ; Table 4.12). Perceived fairness of credit distribution was very similar across groups (presenters:  $M = 3.30$ ,  $SD = 1.49$ ; producers:  $M = 3.20$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ;  $p = .810$ ). Notably, both presenters and producers reported the same mean level of leaving intent ( $M = 3.60$ ), indicating that dissatisfaction with valuation may be experienced across roles, even if the specific mechanisms differ.

Interpreted alongside Section 4.4, these outcomes are consistent with a situation in which formal crediting and public-facing recognition are uneven, yet the broader organisational climate—workload pressures, reward practices, and perceived fairness—may affect both role groups. In other words, even where presenters benefit from more visible crediting, the overall work context may still generate substantial concerns about being undervalued. (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).

#### 4.5.2 Thematic synthesis of open-ended responses

Open-ended responses were analysed thematically to capture how respondents define “being valued”, how credit is experienced as fair or unfair, and what changes they believe would improve fairness. Three interlinked themes emerged: **(1) value as recognition and respect**, **(2) value as fair reward and resourcing**, and **(3) value as visible credit and attribution**.

##### **Theme 1: Value as recognition, respect, and appreciation.**

Across roles, respondents most often framed being valued as being recognised, appreciated, and respected for one’s contribution. Several responses defined value in explicitly relational terms—receiving acknowledgement from supervisors or colleagues, being respected in the team, or being recognised for work done. A smaller number equated value with positive feedback or compliments, suggesting that day-to-day interpersonal recognition matters in how professional worth is experienced. This theme aligns with the symbolic dimension reported earlier (Section 4.2.2), where internal recognition was rated relatively highly, including for producers.

**Illustrative paraphrase:** respondents described being valued as “being appreciated”, “being respected”, or “being recognised for what you do”.

**Theme 2: Value as fair reward, workload, and organisational support.**

A second theme positioned value in practical terms: adequate pay, opportunities for salary progression, and organisational support (resources, trust, and non-exploitative workload). Some respondents described value as “being paid what you are worth” or linked it to salary increases and overtime compensation. Others highlighted organisational conditions that communicate value indirectly, such as having adequate resources to do one’s job, being trusted to deliver without excessive micromanagement, and not being “over-used” or treated as perpetually available. This theme helps explain why leaving intent is relatively high (Table 4.12): even if symbolic recognition is present, perceived undervaluation may persist where reward structures and working conditions are seen as unfair or unsustainable.

**Illustrative paraphrase:** respondents suggested that fairness would improve with better remuneration, overtime bonuses, adequate resources, and reduced micromanagement.

**Theme 3: Value as visible credit and accurate attribution of contribution.**

The third theme connects most directly to Objective 2 findings (Section 4.3): respondents repeatedly described “value” as being attached to **who is publicly credited** for programme success. Many accounts concerned misattribution, where credit for a successful programme or segment was perceived to be allocated to the most visible role rather than to those who produced the work. Several producers described situations in which programmes performed well or won recognition, yet public praise or formal credit accrued to presenters or on-air staff. Conversely, a few respondents described fair crediting experiences such as being publicly mentioned, applauded, or formally recognised indicating that equitable practices do occur but are not consistently institutionalised.

**Illustrative paraphrase:** one respondent described a successful documentary where credit was attributed to an on-air contributor rather than the broader production work; another described a situation in which on-air praise followed a successful show without acknowledgement of backstage contribution. In contrast, a few described being explicitly mentioned or recognised for their work, including through awards or verbal acknowledgement.

**Suggested changes:** formalising credit, reducing favouritism, and equalising recognition opportunities.

When asked what single change would most improve fairness, respondents clustered around three proposals:

Institutionalise crediting and acknowledgement practices (e.g., on-air mention of producers, consistent credits, and public-facing acknowledgement of backstage staff).

Strengthen fairness norms and transparency (explicit calls to reduce favouritism and to recognise effort and contribution on merit).

Improve material and organisational support (better pay, overtime bonuses, adequate resourcing, and professional respect across roles).

Notably, some respondents also emphasised reciprocity: recognition should reflect contribution in both directions, including acknowledging presenters when they undertake production tasks and acknowledging producers when their work drives programme success.

### **4.5.3 Integrated discussion**

Taken together, the quantitative outcomes and qualitative narratives suggest a layered account of valuation. On the one hand, respondents report moderate feelings of being valued and moderate fairness perceptions overall (Table 4.12). On the other hand, the qualitative material shows that “being valued” is often evaluated against concrete everyday signals who receives public credit, who receives pay progression, and who is resourced and trusted while misattribution and unequal visibility can erode perceived fairness. This helps make sense of the relatively high leaving intent: even when internal recognition exists, perceived undervaluation may persist when crediting systems and reward structures systematically favour frontstage roles. (Bourdieu, 1986; Thompson, 2005).

These patterns also connect back to the preceding sections. Section 4.2 demonstrated a stark gap in formal crediting across publicity channels, and the open-ended accounts provide plausible mechanisms for why that gap matters: respondents interpret recognition not only as interpersonal appreciation but also as institutional attribution that affects reputation, opportunity, and bargaining power. In this sense, perceived “value” sits at the intersection of symbolic recognition (being acknowledged), organisational practice (who gets credited), and economic reward (who benefits materially). (Caldwell, 2008; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011).

## 4.6 Objective 4: Institutional factors shaping valuation differences

This section examines organisational mechanisms that shape how producers and presenters are valued in practice. Specifically, it analyses (i) perceived influence over programme content and direction, (ii) perceived bases for promotion, and (iii) patterns of benefits and entitlements access. Because these items were multi-select, counts represent the number of selections and may exceed  $N = 20$ .

### 4.6.1 Perceived influence over programmes

Overall, respondents most frequently located programme influences in station management (CEO/GM) ( $n = 13$ ), followed by producers ( $n = 11$ ) and presenters ( $n = 7$ ) (Table 4.13). Other actors external sponsors/clients ( $n = 3$ ), sales/marketing/brand teams ( $n = 3$ ), editors/news directors ( $n = 2$ ), and political actors/pressure groups ( $n = 1$ ) were selected less often. In practical terms, this distribution indicates that respondents perceive a management-centred influence structure, with producers and presenters operating as important but not ultimate drivers of programme direction.

**Table 0-13: Perceived programme influence (overall; multi-select), n.**

| Option                           | Count |
|----------------------------------|-------|
| Station Management CEO/Gm        | 13    |
| Producers                        | 11    |
| Presenters                       | 7     |
| External Sponsors Clients        | 3     |
| Sales Marketing Brand Team       | 3     |
| Editors News Directors           | 2     |
| Political Actors Pressure Groups | 1     |

Role-disaggregated responses underline different institutional vantage points (Table 4.14). Presenters most often identified producers as influential ( $n = 7$ ), followed by management ( $n = 5$ ) and sales/marketing/brand teams ( $n = 3$ ). Producers, by contrast, most often identified

management as influential ( $n = 8$ ), followed by presenters ( $n = 6$ ) and producers themselves ( $n = 4$ ). Two implications follow:

**Table 0-14: Perceived programme influence by role (presenter vs producer; multi-select), n**

| Option                           | Presenter | Producer |
|----------------------------------|-----------|----------|
| Producers                        | 7         | 4        |
| Station Management Ceo Gm        | 5         | 8        |
| Sales Marketing Brand Team       | 3         | 0        |
| Presenters                       | 1         | 6        |
| External Sponsors Clients        | 1         | 2        |
| Political Actors Pressure Groups | 1         | 0        |
| Editors News Directors           | 0         | 2        |


**Management discretion dominates:** Producers, in particular, position station management as the strongest force shaping programmes. This reinforces the idea that even where producers report substantial operational influence (Section 4.2.3), final control and constraint are perceived as managerial rather than purely editorial or creative. (Caldwell, 2008).

**Influence is perceived differently from each role position:** Presenters tend to see producers as central to programme influence, consistent with producers' backstage coordination and editorial shaping. Producers, however, attribute considerable influence to presenters suggesting that on-air roles may shape decisions indirectly through audience-facing performance, brand considerations, or perceived commercial value, even if presenters themselves do not strongly nominate their own role as influential.

Taken together, the influence pattern points to an institutional environment where programme outcomes are shaped through a combination of managerial authority, backstage production control, and frontstage brand/audience logics, with each role group perceiving the balance differently.

#### 4.6.2 Perceived basis for promotion

Across the full sample, respondents most frequently selected management discretion as the basis for promotion ( $n = 10$ ), followed by performance metrics (ratings/engagement) ( $n = 8$ ), networks/relationships ( $n = 7$ ), professional qualifications ( $n = 6$ ), and then public profile/celebrity ( $n = 5$ ) and seniority/experience ( $n = 5$ ) (Table 4.15). The same pattern is reflected visually in the top selections plotted in Figure 4.8. Overall, these results indicate that promotion is perceived as shaped primarily by discretionary and relational mechanisms (management judgement and networks), with performance metrics also playing a prominent role.



**Figure 0-8: Top reported bases for promotion (overall),  $n$  selections**

**Table 0-15: Perceived basis for promotion (overall; multi-select),  $n$**

| Option                | Count |
|-----------------------|-------|
| Management Discretion | 10    |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Performance Metrics Ratings Engagement | 8 |
| Networks Relationships                 | 7 |
| Professional Qualifications            | 6 |
| Public Profile Celebrity               | 5 |
| Seniority Experience                   | 5 |

Role-group differences are pronounced (Table 4.16). Producers overwhelmingly selected management discretion ( $n = 8$ ) compared with presenters ( $n = 2$ ), implying that producers perceive advancement as strongly dependent on managerial gatekeeping. Presenters, conversely, most frequently selected performance metrics ( $n = 5$ ), networks/relationships ( $n = 5$ ), and professional qualifications ( $n = 5$ ). Producers selected these factors far less often (metrics:  $n = 3$ ; networks:  $n = 2$ ; qualifications:  $n = 1$ ). (Bourdieu, 1986).

**Table 0-16: Perceived basis for promotion by role (presenter vs producer; multi-select), n.**

| Option                                 | Presenter | Producer |
|--|-----------|----------|
| Performance Metrics Ratings Engagement | 5         | 3        |
| Networks Relationships                 | 5         | 2        |
| Professional Qualifications            | 5         | 1        |
| Public Profile Celebrity               | 3         | 2        |
| Seniority Experience                   | 3         | 2        |
| Management Discretion                  | 2         | 8        |

This divergence suggests two partially different “institutional pathways” to advancement as perceived by each group:

For producers, promotion is seen as especially contingent on managerial discretion, consistent with a backstage role embedded in organisational hierarchies where advancement may depend on supervisors' evaluations, internal politics, and access to decision-makers.

For presenters, advancement is seen as more contingent on performance indicators and social capital, consistent with an outward-facing role where metrics (ratings/engagement), networks, and credentials are viewed as central signals of value.

Public profile/celebrity was selected by both groups (presenters:  $n = 3$ ; producers:  $n = 2$ ), indicating that visibility is perceived as relevant but not the single dominant determinant of promotion when compared with management discretion, networks, and metrics. This helps contextualise earlier results: while crediting and publicity strongly favour presenters (Section 4.3.1), respondents still perceive advancement as shaped by institutional gatekeeping and internal relational structures, not visibility alone. (Thompson, 2005).

#### 4.6.3 Benefits and entitlements access

Patterns of benefits access point to a mix of standard employment protections and uneven access to additional support. Overall, respondents most frequently reported access to SSNIT contributions ( $n = 18$ ) and health insurance ( $n = 15$ ), followed by per diem for assignments ( $n = 11$ ) and transport allowance ( $n = 10$ ). Airtime/data allowance was less common ( $n = 7$ ), while overtime payments were rare ( $n = 2$ ). One respondent reported receiving none of the listed benefits ( $n = 1$ ) (Table 4.17).

**Table 0-17: Benefits and entitlements accessed (overall; multi-select), n**

| Option                 | Count |
|------------------------|-------|
| Ssnit Contributions    | 18    |
| Health Insurance       | 15    |
| Per Diem Assignments   | 11    |
| Transport Allowance    | 10    |
| Airtime Data Allowance | 7     |
| Overtime Payments      | 2     |

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| None of the Above | 1 |
|-------------------|---|

Role-disaggregated results indicate that producers reported broader access to formal benefits, particularly health insurance: producers reported SSNIT ( $n = 10$ ) and health insurance ( $n = 10$ ), compared with presenters (SSNIT:  $n = 8$ ; health insurance:  $n = 5$ ) (Table 4.18). Presenters were the only group reporting overtime payments ( $n = 2$ ). In practical terms, this suggests a possible institutional pattern in which producers are more likely to be positioned within benefit-eligible employment arrangements, while presenters may be more exposed to work structures where overtime is relevant but formal benefit coverage is less uniform.

**Table 0-18: Benefits and entitlements accessed by role (presenter vs producer; multi-select), n**

| Option                 | Presenter | Producer |
|------------------------|-----------|----------|
| Ssnit Contributions    | 8         | 10       |
| Health Insurance       | 5         | 10       |
| Per Diem Assignments   | 5         | 6        |
| Transport Allowance    | 4         | 6        |
| Airtime Data Allowance | 3         | 4        |
| Overtime Payments      | 2         | 0        |
| None of the Above      | 1         | 0        |

These benefit patterns complicate a simple reading of “economic advantage”. Although presenters reported higher economic valuation on some indicators (Section 4.3.1), producers appear to access more of the institutionalised protections (notably health insurance and SSNIT coverage). This reinforces the importance of distinguishing between (i) perceptions of pay, job security, and negotiation power, and (ii) actual access to organisational entitlements.

## 4.7 Conclusion

Across Objectives 1–4, Chapter Four findings indicate a structured valuation landscape shaped by both role visibility and organisational governance:

Economic valuation was moderate overall but tended to be higher for presenters, particularly regarding job security and perceived ability to negotiate improved terms (Tables 4.1–4.2; Figure 4.1).

Symbolic recognition was generally high for both groups, with presenters showing some advantage in perceived credit fairness, while producers reported strong internal recognition (Tables 4.3–4.4; Figure 4.2). This pattern is directionally consistent with H1, but the overlap suggests symbolic valuation is not exclusively visibility-driven.

Organisational value/power was higher for producers (Tables 4.5–4.6; Figure 4.3), consistent with the “backstage influence” component of H2.

Crediting practices strongly favoured presenters across publicity channels (Tables 4.7–4.8; Figure 4.4), supporting the “lower formal/public credit” component of H2 and clarifying how public recognition can be institutionally allocated.

Institutional mechanisms identified in this section suggest that valuation is further shaped by management discretion, networks/relationships, and performance metrics, with role differences in how promotion pathways are perceived (Tables 4.13–4.18; Figure 4.8).

Outcome perceptions indicated moderate feelings of value alongside notable leaving intent (Table 4.12; Figure 4.7), implying that perceived undervaluation has potential implications for retention and organisational stability.

The next chapter synthesises these results to draw conclusions about how visibility, crediting systems, and organisational power interact to produce persistent valuation differences between producers and presenters, and to outline implications for policy and practice within Ghana’s media organisations.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

#### 5.0 Summary and Discussion of Key Findings

This chapter synthesises the findings of the study and situates them within existing scholarship on media labour, visibility, and organisational valuation. The findings demonstrate that valuation within the organisation studied is multi-dimensional and role-differentiated rather than uniform, confirming arguments in media labour research that creative work is hierarchically valued across economic, symbolic, and organisational dimensions (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011; Banks et al., 2013).

Economic valuation was found to be moderate overall, with presenters tending to score higher than producers on the Economic Value Index. This pattern aligns with political economy perspectives that emphasise how market-facing roles are more easily monetised due to their association with audience ratings, advertising revenue, and brand visibility (Mosco, 2009; Deuze, 2007). Presenters' relative advantage in perceived economic value reflects their positioning as publicly recognisable figures whose labour is directly legible within commercial media logics.

Symbolic recognition was generally high for both producers and presenters, with only modest role separation on the Symbolic Recognition Index. This finding nuances existing visibility-based explanations of recognition by suggesting that internal acknowledgement within organisations can coexist with unequal public attribution. While presenters benefit from audience-facing recognition, producers often receive strong internal recognition from colleagues and management, reflecting the backstage authority and professional respect attached to their roles (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).

Organisational valuation and power, however, tended to favour producers. Producers reported greater involvement in coordination, planning, and decision-making within production workflows, consistent with production studies that characterise producers as central organisational actors who manage creative labour and operational processes (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer et al., 2009). This finding supports the study's second hypothesis by demonstrating that

producers may exercise substantial organisational influence even when public recognition is limited.

Crediting practices revealed the most pronounced role divide. Presenters were credited more frequently across publicity channels and scored higher on the Crediting Index, while producers reported comparatively low routine attribution. This pattern reflects longstanding concerns in production studies about the uneven distribution of authorship and recognition, where visible roles are foregrounded while collective and backstage labour is rendered invisible (Mayer, 2011; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011). From a Bourdieusian perspective, this unequal crediting contributes to the accumulation of symbolic capital for presenters, reinforcing their professional leverage and status (Bourdieu, 1986).

Visibility was widely perceived as consequential and moderately associated with feeling professionally valued. This finding supports scholarship on celebrity and visibility capital, which argues that public recognition can be converted into professional opportunities, bargaining power, and economic reward (Driessens, 2013; Banet-Weiser, 2012). However, the overlap in visibility perceptions across roles suggests that visibility alone does not fully determine valuation; rather, its effects are mediated by organisational structures and institutional practices.

Institutional mechanisms further help explain these valuation patterns. Programme influence was most frequently attributed to station management, followed by producers and then presenters, indicating a management-centred governance structure. This aligns with political economy analyses that emphasise managerial control over creative decision-making in commercial media organisations (Mosco, 2009). Promotion was perceived to depend largely on management discretion, networks, and performance metrics, reflecting the informal and relational nature of advancement pathways identified in African media contexts (Nyamnjoh, 2015; Gadzekpo, 2018). Differences in benefits access further complicate a simple reading of economic advantage, reinforcing the need to distinguish between pay, job security, and institutional protection.

Taken together, these findings confirm that professional value in Ghanaian media organisations is produced through the interaction of visibility, organisational power, and institutionalised crediting practices rather than through labour input alone.

## **5.1 Recommendations**

The recommendations of this study follow directly from the valuation and crediting patterns identified and are informed by existing scholarship on fair labour practices in creative industries. At the organisational level, there is a clear need to institutionalise transparent crediting standards that consistently acknowledge backstage contributions through on-air credits, promotional materials, and organisational communications. Research in production studies suggests that formalised crediting systems can mitigate perceptions of unfairness and enhance professional legitimacy for less visible roles (Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, 2011).

Second, promotion and recognition systems should be made more transparent by reducing over-reliance on discretionary decision-making and informal networks. Clear articulation of how performance metrics, competencies, and organisational contributions are weighted in advancement decisions would align with best practices in creative labour management and may improve perceptions of fairness and trust (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011). Importantly, evaluation frameworks should capture backstage labour that does not directly translate into audience-facing visibility.

Third, organisational support should address material and welfare concerns identified by respondents, including clarity and equity in benefits, workload distribution, and access to institutional protections. Addressing these issues may improve retention and organisational sustainability, concerns widely documented in studies of precarious creative labour (Banks et al., 2013; International Labour Organization, 2023).

At the sector level, professional bodies and regulators can encourage standardised crediting norms and clearer career progression pathways to reduce persistent recognition gaps between frontstage and backstage roles within Ghana's media industry.

## **5.2 Future Work**

Future research should extend this study to strengthen generalisability and deepen institutional explanation. Comparative studies across multiple media organisations and platforms would

help determine whether the observed valuation patterns are organisation-specific or sector-wide. Such work would contribute to broader debates on labour standardisation within Ghana's media sector.

Methodologically, future studies should triangulate self-reported perceptions with organisational documents such as contracts, promotion criteria, and formal crediting policies to strengthen inference about how valuation is institutionally produced. Further research is also needed to measure production labour more directly, including task distribution and workload intensity, to test more rigorously the relationship between labour input, visibility, and professional value.

Longitudinal research could examine whether reforms to crediting practices and promotion transparency alter perceptions of fairness, symbolic recognition, and retention intentions over time, contributing to evidence-based policy and organisational reform.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Questionnaire

#### QUESTIONNAIRE:

TOPIC: Who Gets the Credit? A Study of How Producers and Presenters Are Valued in Ghana's Media Industry

Questionnaire: Valuation of Producers and Presenters in Ghana's Media Industry

This questionnaire explores how media professionals experience recognition, reward, and influence in Ghanaian media organisations. It takes about 8–12 minutes. Your answers are anonymous and will be reported in aggregate. You may skip any question you are not comfortable answering.

Consent checkbox: I have read the information above, and I agree to participate. (Yes/No)

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#### Section A: Role and Work Context (Objective: role definitions + organisational factors)

1. Primary role (pick one)
  - Presenter/Host/Anchor
  - Producer – News Producer
  - Producer – Show Producer
  - Producer – Line Producer
  - Other (specify)
2. Platform (select all that apply)
  - Radio
  - Television
  - Digital/Online (incl. YouTube, podcast platforms, social-first)
  - Print (if applicable to your org)
  - Other (specify)
3. Organisation type
  - State/public
  - Private/commercial
  - Community/NGO/Non-profit
  - Faith-based
  - Other
4. Employment arrangement
  - Permanent staff
  - Contract staff
  - Freelance/independent contractor

- Part-time
  - Intern/trainee
  - Other
5. Years of experience in media work
- <1,
  - 1–3
  - 4–6
  - 7–10
  - 11–15
  - 16+
6. Typical weekly workload
- <20 hrs
  - 20–39
  - 40–49
  - 50–59
  - 60+

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Section B: Economic Value (pay/security) (Objective 1)

(Keep this non-invasive: use bands and regularity, not exact salary.)

7. My pay is received on time.  
1 Strongly disagree — 5 Strongly agree
8. My pay is commensurate with my responsibilities.  
1–5
9. My employment arrangement provides reasonable job security.  
1–5
10. I have access to benefits (select all that apply)
- SSNIT contributions
  - Health insurance
  - Transport allowance
  - Airtime/data allowance
  - Overtime payments
  - Per diem (assignments)
  - None of the above
  - Other (specify)
11. Approximate monthly earnings (optional)
- Prefer not to say
  - <GHS 1,000

- 1,000–1,999
- 2,000–3,499
- 3,500–4,999
- 5,000–7,499
- 7,500+

12. I can negotiate pay/terms when responsibilities increase.

1–5

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Section C: Symbolic Value (credit, visibility, recognition) (Objective 1 & 2)

13. In my organisation, my contribution is publicly acknowledged (e.g., on-air mention/credits/promos).

1–5

14. In my organisation, my contribution is recognised internally (by managers/colleagues).

1–5

15. How often are you named in any of the following? (Never / Sometimes / Often)

- a) On-air credits / verbal mention
- b) Social media posts from the organisation
- c) Promotional posters/flyers
- d) Press interviews/publicity

16. I believe audience recognition strongly affects professional opportunities in my organisation.

1–5

17. Compared with other roles, my role receives a fair share of credit for programme success.

1–5

18. In my experience, when a programme goes wrong, my role is more likely to be blamed than credited when it succeeds.

1–5

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Section D: Organisational Value and Power (decision rights) (Objective 1 & 4)

19. I have meaningful input into programme editorial decisions (topics, angles, guests).

1–5

20. I have meaningful input into programme planning (rundown, timing, format).

1–5

21. I have the authority to approve or reject content/guests on editorial or compliance grounds.

1–5

22. In my organisation, the people with the most influence over programmes are: (pick up to 2)

- Presenters
- Producers

- Editors/News Directors
- Station management/CEO/GM
- Sales/Marketing/Brand team
- External sponsors/clients
- Political actors/pressure groups (if relevant)
- Other

23. I understand clearly how promotions and role advancement happen in my organisation.

1–5

24. Promotions are based mainly on: (pick up to 2)

- Performance metrics (ratings/engagement)
- Seniority/experience
- Professional qualifications
- Networks/relationships
- Public profile/celebrity
- Management discretion
- Other

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Section E: Visibility Capital (comparative mechanism) (Objective 3)

25. Having a strong personal public profile (e.g., followers, recognisability) improves a worker's bargaining power here.

1–5

26. I have personally experienced increased opportunities due to visibility (e.g., better slots, endorsements, leverage).

1–5 + "Not applicable"

27. I have personally experienced reduced recognition/opportunity due to low visibility.

1–5 + "Not applicable"

28. How important are these for being valued in your organisation? (Not important — Very important)

- a) Audience ratings/engagement
- b) Social media following
- c) Professional competence/skills
- d) Relationships with management
- e) Ability to attract advertisers/sponsors
- f) Reliability/meeting deadlines

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Section F: Role Identity and Fairness (Objective 3)

29. I feel professionally valued in my organisation.

1-5

30. I feel the distribution of credit between roles (producer/presenter/management) is fair.

1-5

31. I have considered leaving my current organisation due to feeling undervalued.

1-5

32. Overall, who gets more credit for programme success in your organisation?

- Presenters
  - Producers
  - Editors/Directors
  - Management
  - It depends (explain briefly)
- 

Section G: Short Open-Ended (high value, still easy)

33. In one sentence, what does “being valued” mean in your workplace?

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34. Describe one example where credit was given fairly or unfairly (no names needed).

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35. What single change would most improve fairness in recognition and reward?

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